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THE BANK CREDIT CARD AND THE
CONSUMER: PROGRAMMING JUSTICE INTO
THE CASHLESS SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION-AN OVERVIEW
During the past decade, the American consumer economy has
been retooling for the advent of the "cashless society."' The most
significant effort in this regard has been the development of the
multipurpose bank card plans, the two most conspicuous of which
have been the current Master Charge and Bank Americard sys-
tems.' By 1971, bank card billings amounted to over 35 percent of
total outstanding consumer credit held by commercial banks, 3
amounting to $4 billion by early 1972. 4 Over 60 million credit cards
issued by federally insured banks were outstanding by the end of
1969.5
While the advantages of bank cards have been pointed out by
a number of writers,' dissatisfaction has developed within consumer
protection ranks concerning the insulation of the banks partici-
pating in the plans from liability arising out of the underlying sales
transactions.7 By use of a waiver-of-defense clause,8 and by structur-
1. Bergstein, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. & COMM. L.
REv. 485 (1967); Survey, Toward a Less-Check Society, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1163 (1972). An
excellent condensed history of the development of the industry prior to 1967 may be found
in Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VAL. U.L. REv. 218
(1967).
2. By 1972, according to Wisconsin's Senator Proxmire, these two plans accounted for
over 95 percent of all bank card business. 118 CONG. REc. S6894 (daily ed. April 27, 1972).
3. Note, Preserving Consumer Defenses in Credit Card Transactions, 81 YALE L.J. 287,
290 & n.12 (1971).
4. 118 CONG. REc. S6894 (daily ed. April 27, 1972) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
5. Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 MICH. L. REv.
1033, 1038 & n.17 (1971). All indications are that this number is continuing to grow substan-
tially. Senator Proxmire has pointed out that during the past three years, outstanding billings
on bank credit cards have grown from $1 billion to $4 billion, and some bankers foresee that
a majority of all consumer credit will be bank card credit within the next few years. 118 CONG.
REc. S6894 (daily ed. April 27, 1972).
6. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 5, at 1037-40; Note, Credit Cards-A Survey of the
Bank Card Revolution and the Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 DE PAUL
L. REv. 389 (1967).
7. Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HsIv. L. REv. 1409, 1418-
21 (1972); Note, supra note 3; Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer
Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 441, 445-46 (1967).
8. Master Charge utilizes the following waiver:
Issuer shall have no responsibility for merchandise or services purchased through use
of a card. Any dispute with respect to such merchandise or services shall be settled
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ing the transaction as a direct loan,9 the present bank cards have
effectively circumvented the current attack on holder-in-due-course
protections for the creditor. ° Basically, in most states," the con-
between Cardholder and the merchant concerned; and Cardholder agrees to pay
Issuer for purchases even though a dispute may exist.
9. Generally, the banks have prevailed in viewing the credit card transaction as a direct
loan. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code treats the bank card as a loan, per §§ 2.104(2)(a)
and 3.106(3).
10. An analysis of the holder-in-due-course doctrine in consumer sales may be found
in Hartman & Walker, The Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77 CoM. L.J.
116 (1972). See also James, Holder-in-due-Course and Other Prohibitions on Agreements, 26
Bus. LAW. 881 (1971); Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Commercial Paper: The Failure of
the Subjective Test, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966); Note, A Consumer Challenge to Holder-in-
Due-Course Status of Financial Institutions, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 626 (1971); Comment,
Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L.
REv. 505.
Judicial reaction to the inappropriateness of the holder-in-due-course doctrine in con-
sumer transactions has led to denial of that status when evidence of "close connections"
between the financer and the merchant can be found. Appellant's reply brief in the recent
California case of Payne v. United California Bank, 23 Cal. App. 3d 352, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1972), a credit card class action, gave the following chronological recap of this judicial
reaction: Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940); Palmer v.
Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941); First & Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank
v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County
Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d
649 (Fla. 1953); Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962); Local
Acceptance Co. v. Kincaid, 361 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1962); Norman v. Worldwide Distrib., Inc.,
202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); International Fin. Corp. v. Reiger, 272 Minn. 192,
137 N.W.2d 172 (1965); Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford & Co., 177 So. 2d 878 (D.C.
App. Fla. 1965); Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 299 A.2d 712 (1967); Unico
v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d
1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968); Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 447 P.2d 638 (1968);
Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1969); Jones v. Approved
Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543,
264 A.2d 547 (1969); Gross v. Applegren, 467 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1970); Kennard v. Reliance, Inc.,
264 A.2d 832 (Md. 1970).
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 2.403 prohibits use of negotiable instruments in
consumer sales transactions and denies holder-in-due-course status to purchasers of negotia-
ble notes who knowingly violate this prohibition. (The Uniform Consumer Credit Code has
been adopted in Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.) In
addition, several states have adopted statutes limiting or prohibiting the use of negotiable
instruments in retail installment sales, most recently, Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
255D, § 25A (Supp. 1971), Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. R.S. tit. 11, § 3-302(5) (Supp.
1972), and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-38.2 (Supp. 1972).
11. Massachusetts has made credit card issuers liable to debtors' defenses when "the
creditor was the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in the sale or
lease transaction as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the seller or lessor."
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1971). At the very least, this will cover those situa-
tions where the same bank deals with both consumer and merchant. If an argument is made
that "issuer" as used in the statute refers to the particular bank card system (e.g., Master
Charge) as a whole, the effect of the statute will be much broader. California protects con-
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sumer who uses the bank credit card is isolated as the sole risk-
bearing party when merchandise is delivered in a defective condi-
tion or when the merchant fails in some other way to perform his
obligation. 2 For example, in the situation where the consumer uses
his credit card to purchase a camera and upon using it finds it to
be defective in some way, the bank will demand payment in full
regardless of such defect. By signing the sales slip at the time of
purchase, the consumer has bound himself to pay the bank indepen-
dent of any claims he may have against the merchant regarding the
underlying sale.'3 As against the merchant, the consumer soon finds
that legal redress is more costly than the original expenditure he
made for the camera,'4 and even if the consumer believes he will
recover the costs of his suit, he still faces the problem of paying his
legal costs prior to recovery.' 5 Clearly, unless the consumer has an
unusually sound financial base and an inordinate amount of per-
serverence, he will be obliged to pay for the camera even if it never
works, or is never even delivered to him.
That such a situation has developed is due in large part to the
tendency of legal writers to force the credit card concept into some
sumer defenses if the purchase price exceeds $50, the purchase is within the state, a good faith
effort has been made by the cardholder to obtain satisfaction from the merchant, and card-
holder notifies the card issuer of the existence of the dispute and its particulars. CAL. Cw.
CoDE § 1747.90(a)(2) (Supp. 1972). Arizona preserves consumer defenses for non-perishable
consumer goods purchased within the state. Axsz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-145(A), (B)(1),
(B)(2) (Supp. 1972).
12. Credit cards are a great facility for the true con artist. Payne v. United California
Bank, 23 Cal. App. 3d 352, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1972), shows the speed with which the fast
operator can work when aided by the credit card plan. There, a vacuum cleaner sales plan
discounted over $23,000 worth of sales slips in less than a month-and-a-half, prior to being
terminated by the issuing bank. See Note, supra note 3, at 292-94. The California Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of the Payne case for failure to establish a proper class for a
class action suit. Payne v. United California Bank, supra.
13. See note 8 supra. Notice that even those purporting to represent the creditor's
interests will admit that such a clause is hardly the result of "bargaining" as the term is
generally accepted: "The one thing certain about the typical consumer's execution of a
purchase contract with a waiver of defense clause is that he is unaware of the consequences
of signing. The instrument is a contract of adhesion." Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation,
a Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445, 472 (1968).
14. An interesting account of the difficulties encountered when a consumer pursues
such a claim is found in Schrag, Bleakhouse 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 115 (1969). Although the financial institutions in that case may have been
somewhat more zealous than the ordinary merchant would be expected to be, it is quite clear
that a suit of any consequence will be economically unsound even if the consumer is assured
that he will prevail.
15. See Ecovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for the Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress,
66 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 281, 285-92 (1971).
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established legal theory." Thus the credit card has been likened to
assignments of commercial paper, 7 letters of credit,18 conventional
checks, 9 secured transactions0 and direct loans."' The problem is
that none of the existing legal theories were developed with the
credit card in mind;22 the result has been that each of the pre-
existing theories or classifications has failed to cover the entire spec-
trum of relationships involved in the credit card transaction. Moreo-
ver, since the banks generally make the decision as to which of the
existing legal theories shall be applied, 23 the tendency has been to
utilize those theories which provide the greatest protection and
profit for the commercial interests. The consumer has little choice
but to accept the card as presented or forego for the time being the
advantages of the "cashless society."
THE MECHANICS OF THE MULTIPARTY CHARGE CARD
The history and development of the credit card phenomenon
has been fully discussed elsewhere.24 For the purposes of this note,
a description of the multiparty charge card and the bank inter-
change system will be sufficient. Under these arrangements, there
are four primary parties to the typical transaction: the cardholder,
the issuing bank, the merchant and the depository bank.25
16. See, e.g., Clontz, Bank Credit Cards under the Uniform Commercial Code, 87
BANKING L.J. 888 (1970); Cooper, The Bank Credit Card Revolution and Articles 4 & 5, 24
Bus. LAW. 133 (1968); Davenport, supra note 1; Note, supra note 6.
17. Note, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REv.
459, 475-78 (1960).
18. Davenport, supra note 1, at 234-40; Note, supra note 6, at 391-96.
19. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 5, at 1049-50.
20. Clontz, supra note 17, at 894-904.
21. See note 9 supra.
22. Clontz, supra note 17, at 891: "One of the difficulties in applying the U.C.C. princi-
ples to Credit Card plans of the Cardholder-Bank agreement type is that neither the U.C.C.
nor the plans took each other into consideration in their respective formation."
23. Thus, banks in New Jersey which have traditionally operated under the direct loan
theory may face a situation where, by restructuring their credit card plans to the purchase of
accounts theory, they would be able to raise interest rates significantly. Predictably, given
this choice, the banks will "change theories" in order to avail themselves of the higher rates.
Panel Discussion, Bank Credit Cards-Problems under Regulation Z, and Possible Problems
as a Result of Future Developments under Proposed Consumer Legislation, 27 Bus. LAW. 111,
113-14 (1971). The changeover would have little effect on the functional aspects of the system,
merely requiring a restructuring of the sales slip. From the consumer's vantage, at least, this
is just "old milk in new cans." It is hard to see what it is about the "new" system which would
make it more deserving of the higher rate. For the consumer, the only clear change is that
the new system costs more.
24. See Davenport, supra note 1; Survey, supra note 1, at 1178-84.
25. Regional banks may increase the actual number of parties involved, but, for the
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1973], Art. 10
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The consumer applies for and obtains a card from a local bank,
termed the issuing bank. By accepting and using the card, the con-
sumer agrees to pay the issuing bank for all purchases made with
the card prior to its return to the issuer, or notice of loss of the card.
The issuing bank in turn communicates, via an interchange system,
with thousands of other banks."6 These banks solicit merchants to
participate in the system, as may the issuing bank. When the mer-
chant enters the system, he deals with the bank which solicited him,
which bank becomes his depository bank. This bank agrees to ex-
change cash credit at a discounted rate" for all sales slips generated
by the use of the charge cards. The depository bank becomes the
sole contact between the merchant and the bank card system insofar
as redemption of sales slips is concerned."
When the consumer uses his charge card, a sales slip is im-
printed with certain information contained on the face of the card
identifying, among other things, the consumer and the issuing bank.
The slip also carries a description of the merchandise sold, the price
of each item and a restatement of the cardholder's promise to pay
the issuer the total shown on the slip.9 This slip is deposited by the
merchant with his depository bank. The depository bank credits the
account of the merchant with the appropriate percentage of the face
value of the slip,30 and the slip is then processed through the inter-
change system and billed to the customer by the issuer.
DEFENSE CUTOFFS-AN UNNECESSARY AND INDEFENSIBLE BURDEN ON
THE CONSUMER
As indicated, the two major bank credit card systems concep-
purposes of analysis of legal relationships, the four parties mentioned are primary. See Bran-
del & Leonard, supra note 5, at 1034-37 for a functional analysis of the multiparty transac-
tion, including intervening regional banks.
26. The two major plans above account for over 9,000 associated banks. See Note, supra
note 3, at 289 n.9.
27. An interview with the Northern Indiana Bank in Valparaiso, Indiana, indicates a
current discount of three percent; thus, for each dollar reflected on the sales slip, the mer-
chant's account with the bank is credited with 97 cents.
28. Under limited circumstances, the merchant will be required to pre-authorize a card
sale through an authorization center designated by the bank card system; these slips, once
authorized, are also exchanged through the depository bank.
29. The Master Charge slip provides:
The issuer of the card identified on this item is authorized to pay the amount shown
as TOTAL upon proper presentation. I promise to pay such total (together with any
other charges due thereon) subject to and in accordance with the agreement govern-
ing the use of such card.
30. See note 27 supra.
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tualize use of their credit cards as a direct loan transaction." By
doing so, the banks not only avoid reliance on the somewhat preca-
rious holder-in-due-course doctrine,32 but they also are able to avoid
many of the current statutes designed to invalidate waiver-of-
defense clauses in consumer installment sales contracts.33 According
to the bank viewpoint, the user of the bank card stands in the same
shoes as the person who goes directly to the bank for a loan and then
makes an independent cash purchase. Hence, according to the
banking interests, the consumer should have no better right against
the bank for merchant failures under the credit card purchase than
he would have if he had actually taken out an independent loan;
since the bank would be free of liability in the loan situation, so
should it be in the credit card situation.
This latter attitude evidences a distinct philosophical approach
to the advent of the cashless consumer economy which is short-
sighted and offensive. The argument implies that the unavailability
of a practical remedy in the cash sale/direct loan transaction for
defective or undelivered merchandise is a positive, or at least a
neutral characteristic of the present system." This approach would
certainly negate much of the progress made by consumers in the
negotiable instrument situation3 and in the credit 36 and secured
sales37 transactions as defined under the Uniform Consumer Credit
31. See note 9 supra. It is interesting to note that the banks reinforce this legal concep-
tualization in their advertising campaigns. Bank Americard has adopted the slogan "Think
of it as money." One wonders if this slogan is meant for the consumers or for the lawmakers.
32. See note 10 supra.
33. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code is a good example. Under the UCCC, the
waiver of defenses may be invalidated as to "credit sales" as defined under section 3.106 of
the Code; however, the Code does not restrict the right to use waiver-of-defense clauses in
the bank card transaction, which it defines not as a credit sale, but as a loan. Uniform
Consumer Credit Code §§ 1-301(9), 3-106(3).
34. But see Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 Hnav. L. Rxv. 1409,
1421 (1972): "[A]ny similarity between credit card purchases and cash sales is irrelevant.
The costs of seller misconduct in cash sales fall on the buyer by necessity rather than by
design."
35. See note 10 supra.
36. See note 33 supra.
37. The UCC, adopted in all states except Louisiana, remains relatively neutral on
waivers-of-defense in secured transactions, providing in the comments to 9-206 that: "This
Article takes no position on the controversial question whether a buyer of consumer goods
may effectively waive defenses by contractual clause or by execution of a negotiable note."
UCC § 9-206 provides in part:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers
or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense he may have against the seller or lessor is
[Vol. 7
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Code and Uniform Commercial Code, since the protections being
developed in current code drafts may be held inapplicable to the
direct loan transaction.
More importantly, under the present bank card practices,the
merits of a great majority of consumer complaints will never be
tried. Since the burden is on the consumer to assert his claim, and
since assertion of most claims is economically unsound when a law-
yer is involved,3" verbal protest is the best (if not the only) remedy
available to the complaining consumer. Indeed, if the present situa-
tion is to be defended, that defense must accept the premise that
merchants will have near-absolute discretion to determine whether
particular claims should be remedied. Merchants, as a practical
matter, will be the final arbiters of their own adversary disputes.
Why should this be so? Commercial banking interests are quick
to point out that if the risk of nonperformance by merchants were
shifted to them, the costs of policing thousands of merchants39
would be prohibitive. 0 The prospect of massive consumer abuse of
the privilege of asserting defenses is also relied upon. The banks
argue that once the consumer takes possession of the merchandise,
the temptation will be to utilize the cost of litigation as a lever in
negotiations with collecting banks. Since banks will no longer be
able to avoid consumer defenses, they will face the unenviable
choice between the expense of an uncollectable account or the ex-
pense of legal fees and court costs in excess of the amount ultimately
recovered.
Though appealing at first, the argument that the banks will be
unduly burdened is fallacious for several reasons. First, the banks
enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and
without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be
asserted against a holder-in-due course of a negotiable instrument under the Article
on Commercial Paper (Article 3).
Several states have abolished waivers-of-defense as contrary to public policy when the seller
and his assignor are closely associated. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn.
543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). Moreover, state
legislatures have increasingly seen fit to limit in some way waivers-of-defense in consumer
sales. See Note, supra note 3, at 288-89 n.7.
38. See note 14 supra.
39. The latest Master Charge application boasts of 500,000 businesses in 44 countries
who welcome the Master Charge card.
40. The examples given typically involve the issuing bank attempting to police all
500,000 merchants, or one merchant thousands of miles distant. See, for example, the prob-
lem set out in Panel Discussion, Bank Credit Cards, supra note 23, at 117-18. The fallacy in
such reasoning is discussed in the text; see notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
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have a contractual right to charge back sales slips to the original
merchant whenever a cardholder raises a defense related to the
underlying sale." Furthermore, the merchant has agreed in his con-
tract to indemnify the depository bank and the card system from
liability arising out of any sale. 2 Clearly, the banks have provided
themselves ample protection by shifting the burden entirely to the
merchant.
A third weakness in the banking position is that abuse may be
simply avoided if statutory provision is made for collection of attor-
ney's fees by the prevailing party in any suit involving a disputed
billing. 3 This would screen out patently frivolous defenses, if only
because most attorneys will recognize such defenses and will realize
that their own prospects for recovery of fees will be significantly
diminished when the court has assessed the fees of the opposing
party upon the complaining consumer-client.
Most importantly, by placing the consumer in a position to
assert his legitimate defenses against the suing bank, or by shifting
the burden of initiating suit to the merchant if the sales slip is
41. Master Charge utilizes the following clause in its Merchant-Bank agreement form:
14. Town & Country may refuse to accept any sales slip, or revoke its prior accept-
ance thereof, and in the event of such revocation Member agrees to repay Town &
Country the total face amount of such sales slip, in any one or more of the following
circumstances:
(a) The Charge Card sale giving rise to such sales slip was not made in compliance
with all the terms and conditions of this Agreement (including the provisions of
Paragraphs 4 and 5, unless such provisions were waived by the appropriate Authori-
zation Center in accordance with Paragraph 6), as well as all applicable laws and
regulations of any governmental authority.
(b) The Cardholder of the Charge Card used in such sale disputes his liability to
the Issuer on any one or more of the following grounds:
(i) that the merchandise or services covered by such sales slip were returned, re-
jected or defective in some respect, or Member has failed to perform any obligation
on its part in connection with such merchandise or services, and Member has refused
to issue a credit slip in the proper amount; or
(ii) that the signature on the sales slip was not that of the Cardholder or any
Authorized User, and Town & Country in good faith believes that Member should
have discovered this fact by examination of the signature appearing in the signature
panel on the reverse of the Cardholder's Charge Card (unless the appropriate Author-
ization Center waived this defect in accordance with Paragraph 6).
42. The Master Charge contract reads:
All disputes between Member and any purchaser relating to any Charge Card sale
shall be settled between Member and such purchaser. Member agrees to indemnify
and hold Depository Bank and Town & Country harmless from any claim or liability
relating to any such sale.
43. See notes 82 and 83 infra and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1973], Art. 10
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charged back, such a system would encourage a trial of the merits
of most substantial consumer-merchant disputes. Surely this will
result in added costs for some merchants, and most probably these
cost increases will be reflected in prices charged to consumers gener-
ally. Equally certain will be an added burden on the banks, even if
they adopt a policy of charging back all disputed slips;" these costs
will also be passed on to the consumer. But this result is not alone
persuasive that the system is best left in its present state.
It is important to keep in mind the precise comparison to be
made if these added costs are to be taken into consideration. Ele-
mentary contract law will illustrate that, in the simplest analysis,
a judgment has been made that consumers should not have to pay
for defective or undelivered merchandise. If this is so, the proper
economic comparison is not between the costs of the present system
as against the foreseeable costs of a system where consumer defenses
are preserved, but rather between the projected costs of adjudica-
tion of all substantial claims under the present system, and the
costs of similar adjudication under the proposed new system.
Viewed from this perspective, the elimination of the present
insulation of banks from consumer defenses presents several advan-
tages. Initially, the bank will be expected to file fewer suits, since
the obvious alternative of charging back will prevail when prelimi-
nary investigation indicates a successful defense. Merchants may be
expected to avoid filing suit in many instances where settlement
presents a more economical solution." In the event that they do sue,
the costs of initiation of the suit may be expected to be less for the
retained attorney of the merchant, who is familiar with such pro-
ceedings, than for the average attorney hired by the consumer for a
particular suit."
44. See Panel Discussion, Bank Credit Cards, supra note 23, at 119 & n.15. The note
indicates that the estimated "clerical costs alone" of processing an undisputed chargeback
within the same regional area exceeds $10 per slip. This is somewhat hard to accept, since it
represents between two and three full hours of clerical work. No doubt, a chargeback repre-
sents some additional costs, however, and to that extent, there will be added costs within the
system. One possible solution, from the bank viewpoint, would be to charge the merchant an
additional fee for slips charged back.
45. Presently, of course, settlement is never an economically sound solution in a pure
sense, since the merchant who is confronted under the existing system will have been paid
already and will usually be justified in presuming that the complaining consumer will not
make the investment necessary to sue. See Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J.
576, 577 & n.8 (1969).
46. See Schrag, supra note 14. It would appear that specialization has its economies in
the law of retail sales. At the very least, the lawyer who only occasionally handles such
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Moreover, even if the merchant does assume an additional bur-
den by being forced to initiate suits, he still enjoys several signifi-
cant advantages. Default judgments will still be available in a great
number of cases. For many consumers, particularly in low income
areas, the legal system is viewed with great apprehension and cyni-
cism. While such people may be willing to withhold payments, they
will not appear in court to assert defenses availble to them. 7 Nor
will many of those who are familiar with the consequences of a
blemished credit report be willing to risk such a blemish by abso-
lutely refusing to pay.48
Finally, it should be remembered that the burden will still be
on the consumer to substantiate his claimed defense. Mere assertion
of a consumer's dissatisfacton will not present a significant obstacle
to recovery by the merchant who has performed his obligations. The
only significant disadvantage the merchant will face under the pro-
posed system will be that he will have to confront claims more often
than under the present circumstances, in which the bank card sys-
tem becomes the bill collector. It is contended that this is a legiti-
mate cost of doing business in an economy in which the consumer
should be afforded meaningful protection against merchant fraud
and sale of defective merchandise.
In those cases where the merchant whose performance is being
challenged is unavailable for charge back of the slip by the bank,
as by insolvency, the bank system will be forced to sue on the slip
and to meet the defenses asserted by the consumer. In this circum-
stance, the banking interests point out that the burden is an unfair
one since the issuing bank presently faces the burden of pressing the
claim. 9 They point out that the issuing bank has no way of monitor-
ing the activities of a merchant with whom the issuing bank has had
no regular dealings. This argument presupposes that the depository
bank, which solicited the merchant and brought him into the plan,
is not a party to the lawsuit and cannot be reached to share in any
liability arising out of the sale.
It must be kept in mind that the bank credit card is the product
litigation will find it necessary to research a great deal of law that the specialist will have at
his fingertips. Moreover, the attorney who specializes will be likely to have standardized
forms for the more common situations.
47. Ecovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 15, at 282-85; Mueller, supra note 45, at 579.
48. Mueller, supra note 45, at 472 n.7.
49. See note 40 supra.
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of an integrated system. If the depository bank is isolated from
liability it is because the system determines that it should be. Quite
simply, the system may provide for charging of losses suffered as a
result of merchant misconduct to the bank responsible for bringing
the offending merchant into the program. This would place the risk
of seller misconduct where it should be: with the party which has
the greatest opportunity to monitor the activities of the merchant
involved. Such a bank may have continuing access to the financial
status of the merchant," and should the merchant appear to be
approaching financial insolvency, only this bank has the where-
withal to discover this promptly and to remove such a merchant
from the bank card system.5'
The ultimate result, regardless of which bank absorbs the par-
ticular loss, is that the economic burden is subsumed into the costs
of the system as a whole. Such a result is desirable since the system
is able to spread the loss over the entire range of responsible partici-
pants in the credit card transaction: the consumers, the merchants
and the banks. The delegation of some risk to the banks involved is
justifiable in light of the fact that bank card credit is often a catalyst
for increased consumer spending. Further, since the banks deter-
mine which merchants benefit by these sales, the banks should
properly take responsibility for fraud assignable to such merchants.
This is especially so when it is realized that many of the merchants
participating in the plan could not otherwise offer sales on credit.
Finally, by placing the responsibility for merchant misbehavior with
those who are responsible for, and profit from, the operations of the
50. The Master Charge contract provides:
13. Member agrees that:
(b) Representatives of Town & Country or any Issuer may, during normal business
hours, inspect, audit and make copies of Member's books, accounts, records and files
pertaining to Charge Card sales and refunds or adjustments thereon, and Member
agrees to preserve its records of any Charge Card sale and any refund or credit
adjustment thereon for at least one year from date of such refund or adjustment.
It is assumed that the depository bank would be a "representative" of Town & Country as
contemplated by this clause. If not, it is because the Town & Country system determines that
the depository bank should not be. Obviously, there would be no barrier to the appointment
of the depository bank as representative if Town & Country determined to do so.
51. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 5, point out that the only positive way to keep a
merchant out of the system would be for all depository banks to conspire to keep him out.
But then, the authors point out, the banks may well be in violation of the Sherman Act. Short
of conspiracy, however, local banks may exchange information about merchants excluded by
any local bank. While this would not preclude a bank from taking on a merchant previously
dropped by another bank, it would notify the bank soliciting the merchant of the risks
involved in doing so.
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merchants under the plan, the bank card system will fulfill the
justifiable expectations of those who use the cards as consumers.
SENATE BILL S.652
It is contended that the present situation is not acceptable in
that, as a practical matter, no avenues exist for the aggrieved con-
sumer to present the merits of his case to anyone other than his
immediate adversary, the merchant. As a result, the cashless con-
sumer economy, at least in its embryonic stage, is morally out of
balance. It provides no effective means to allocate economic losses
to the parties at fault when the merchant fails in the underlying
sales obligation. True enough, the same problem presently exists as
to the cash sale, but it would seem shortsighted not to explore possi-
ble solutions to this problem in the credit card transaction merely
because no practical solution exists for the cash transaction. Even
the most ardent advocate of the banking and business interests
would not contend that a consumer with a valid claim or complaint
should be denied an opportunity to present the merits of his claim.
The problem, of course, is in balancing the general interests of other
consumers, merchants and banking interests in the convenience and
economy of the charge card transaction against the interests of those
consumers who are victims of merchant abuse.
Senate bill S.652, recently introduced by Senators Proxmire
and Brooke,52 represents the most recent legislative attempt to bal-
ance the competing interests referred to above. The provision of that
bill which deals with the preservation of consumer defenses in the
credit card sale was defeated by a vote of 46 to 35 on April 27, 1972.53
That bill, in pertinent part, provided:
A card issuer who has issued a credit card to a cardholder
pursuant to an open-end consumer credit plan shall be sub-
ject to all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses aris-
ing out of any transaction in which the credit card is used
as a method of payment or extension of credit if (1) the
obligor has made a good faith attempt to obtain satisfactory
resolution of a disagreement or problem relative to the
transaction from the person honoring the credit card; (2)
the amount of such initial transaction exceeds $50; (3) the
place where the initial transaction occurred was in the same
52. 118 CONG. REC. S6882 (daily ed. April 27, 1972).
53. Id. at 6900-01.
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State as the State in which the card issuer maintains a
place of business; and (4) the amount of claims or defenses
asserted by the cardholder does not exceed: (a) the initial
amount of credit extended in connection with the initial
transactions giving rise to the claim or defense provided the
cardholder notifies the card issuer or person honoring the
card of such claim or defense within three months from the
date of such transaction; or (b) if the cardholder notifies the
card issuer or person honoring the card of such claim or
defense later than three months following the date of such
transaction, the amount outstanding with respect to such
transaction at the time of such notification. For the purpose
of determining such amount outstanding in the preceding
sentence, the payments and credits to the cardholder's ac-
count are deemed to have been applied, in the order indi-
cated, to the payment of: (i) late charges in the order of
their entry to the account; (ii) finance charges in order of
their entry to the account; and (iii) debits to the account
other than those set forth above, in the order in which each
debit entry to the account was made.
Objections to the bill, expressed during the debates which took
place in the Senate, indicated five major problems:
(1) The change to the cashless economy would be impeded.
Senator Tower, fearing that any added burdens on the bank card
plans might jeopardize their continued existence, pointed out that
the plans "improve the delivery of purchasing power throughout the
economy"54 by releasing "large sums of capital that are tied up in
the mechanics of cash use, storage, and transfer." 5 Further, Senator
Tower pointed to the usefulness of the cashless economy in prevent-
ing or deterring "violent economic crimes."5 Neither of these ad-
vantages is to be underestimated. However, there are concomitant
disadvantages in the bank card transaction. The cash transaction
has two inherent consumer protections which will be lost with the
transition to the credit card economy. In a cash sale, the economic
limitations of a given consumer are a natural bar to overreaching by
that consumer: if he has no cash, he cannot buy anything. More-
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over, even if he has a very strong urge to make a purchase, and
determines to borrow money to do so, the mechanics of the true
direct loan transaction provide a built-in "cooling off" period during
which the consumer is likely to give some consideration to his total
financial capabilities. 7 The credit card transaction provides no such
deterrent to overreaching by the consumer.
(2) It is not reasonable or practical to require banks to police
the business practices of merchants. Senator Brock objected to the
Proxmire bill on the basis that it could not adequately protect con-
sumers.58 Senator Brock presented a hypothetical situation involv-
ing a small issuing bank in Mountain City, Tennessee and a mer-
chant in Memphis, commenting that the Mountain City bank "can-
not exclude that merchant because he does not know him, never
heard of him, never saw him, and never will."" Here it may first be
pointed out that it is not the card-issuing bank (which may be
thousands of miles away)6t that must face the burden of enforcing
standards of business practice upon the merchant. Rather, as indi-
cated above,6' it may be the depository bank which brought the
merchant into the bank card plan and which has a contractual right
to review the books of the merchant at any time.62 Furthermore,
even the depository bank is not necessarily bound to spend an inor-
dinate amount of time reviewing sales procedures, since that bank
retains the option of charging back sales slips to which consumer
defenses have been asserted. 3 It is only when the merchant involved
is insolvent or otherwise unavailable that the depository bank must
stand the loss resulting from the successful consumer defense, and
even this possibility may be largely avoided by requiring an ade-
quate reserve account to be left on deposit by those merchants
whose financial standing may seem questionable. 4 Finally, since
the depository banks require by contract that associated merchants
meet certain sales standards,65 the bill would do no more than re-
quire the banks to enforce their own contracts.
57. See Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination
of Negotiability and the Cooling-off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
58. 118 CONG. REC. S6897 (daily ed. April 27, 1972).
59. Id.
60. See Brandel & Leonard, supra note 5, at 1046.
61. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 50 supra.
63. See note 41 supra.
64. See Note, supra note 3, at 297 & n.42.
65. The Master Charge Merchant-Bank agreement provides: "12. Member shall estab-
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(3) This is a state problem and may have different ramifica-
tions for different states. Senator Tower, speaking in opposition to
the bill, indicated that the "area of consumer remedies against mer-
chants is normally one governed by State statutory and common
law . . .. "I Senator Tower further stated that "it would be wiser
to continue to allow the States to control the law in this area and
to shape it according to their own respective needs and concerns.""7
Anticipating this objection, Senator Proxmire made a rather clear
showing of the national scope of the bank credit card business in
presenting his bill to the Senate.18 Charge cards are used and ac-
cepted in all 50 states, and Proxmire pointed out the "confusing and
chaotic" situation which exists and will continue to exist while each
state maintains a separate policy regarding use of the cards and the
legal relationships resulting. 9 In the last analysis, it may be said
with some certainty that no state will have or assert an interest in
continuation of consumer fraud. If national legislation is drafted
which will limit or reduce such fraud while protecting the continued
existence of the bank card system in some meaningful way, no pecu-
liar state interests will be threatened.
(4) Preserving defenses will require a tightening of standards
for cardholders and merchants, thus prejudicing the little guy and
the small businessman. Senators Brock and Tower pointed out that
credit card financing is critical to many small businesses and that
it is these businesses that serve consumers lowest on the socioecon-
omic scale. 0 According to the Senators, it would be these marginal
credit risk consumers who would suffer as a result of the proposed
legislation." It is submitted that the requirements for participation
in the plans by cardholders are not likely to change in any signifi-
cant way as a direct result of preservation of consumer defenses. The
issuing bank is basically interested in the ability of the prospective
cardholder to meet his obligations as they come due. There is no
reason to believe that preservation of defenses will affect this pri-
mary consideration, particularly since the "little guy" referred to by
Senator Tower is the least likely of all cardholder applicants to be
lish and maintain a fair policy for the exchange or return of, or adjustment on, merchandise
or services sold in Charge Card sales."
66. 118 CONG. REc. S6896 (daily ed. April 27, 1972).
67. Id.
68, Id. at 6894.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6898.
71. Id.
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aware of his rights, or to use them even if defenses are maintaina-
ble.7" There is, however, likely to be some tightening of requirements
for merchant participation in the plans, at least with respect to the
financial reserves necessary to enter the system and deposit reserves
necessary to remain there. 3 The banks will naturally be interested
in limiting the number of merchants in their plan who become insol-
vent.74
(5) This should be viewed as a direct loan/cash sale. Senator
Bennett, arguing against any analogy to the holder-in-due-course
situation, characterized the bank card sale as a direct loan/cash sale
transaction." The analogy to the cash sale has been touched upon
previously.76 The analogy is objectionable both in terms of its accu-
racy and in terms of its philosophical underpinnings. In the true
direct loan transaction there is, as pointed out above, a built-in
"cooling off" mechanism. Moreover, in the credit card situation,
only selected merchants may honor the card, and these merchants
are at least tacitly endorsed by the bank card system with which
they affiliate.77 The system determines where the "new money '7 8
may or may not be spent, and the system has continuing contractual
control of the financial and sales policies of the merchants which
will honor the "new money." The bank which makes a true direct
loan has no such control over the merchants to be patronized with
the proceeds of the loan, and makes no such endorsement of particu-
lar places of business. Furthermore, the fact that consumers have
no practical remedies in the cash sale does not sanctify this dispar-
ity in bargaining power. It is a necessary evil of the cash sale trans-
action, and there is no requirement that the "cashless society" re-
72. See note 47 supra.
73. These requirements are not likely to be unreasonably high, however, since the
statistical risk of merchant misconduct and insolvency coinciding should not be expected to
amount to an overriding consideration when weighed against the benefits of increased partici-
pation in the system.
74. The resulting scrutiny will avoid allowing the card plans to become a device for the
shady operator to ply his trade with a minimum of personal risk, as may presently be the
case. See note 12 supra.
75. 118 CONG. REc. S6900 (daily ed. April 27, 1972).
76. See notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text.
77. In fact, one of the theories used in Payne v. United California Bank, 23 Cal. App.
3d 352, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1972) (discussed in note 12 supra) was negligent misrepresentation
for this very "endorsement." Plaintiffs there relied on Hanberry v. Hearst, 276 Cal. App. 2d
820, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969), a case involving the Good Housekeeping Seal, where the
endorsement of defective shoes resulted in liability for the endorser.
78. See note 31 supra.
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tain these inequities. It seems incredible that this fact is asserted
as a justification for imposing defense cutoffs under the new system.
This is particularly so if, as predicted, the credit card replaces those
financing arrangements in which the consumer is now protected.79
For the consumer, such a "cashless society" would be bittersweet,
at best.
A PROPOSED STATUTE
It is clear that some solution must be found that will reasonably
protect the consumer in the bank card sale, but will at the same
time be acceptable to the commercial interests and compatible with
the continued growth of the bank card phenomenon. With this in
mind, the following statute is offered for consideration:
A. A card issuer who has issued a card to a cardholder
pursuant to an open-end consumer credit plan shall be sub-
ject to all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses aris-
ing out of any transaction in which the credit card is used
as a method of payment or extension of credit for the pur-
chase or rental of durable consumer goods if:
(1) The obligor has made a good faith attempt to obtain
satisfactory resolution of a disagreement or problem rela-
tive to the transaction from the person honoring the credit
card by promptly notifying that person of the details of the
complaint and by offering to return the purchased item for
full refund;
(2) The obligor has promptly notified the issuing bank or
association of the details of the dispute;
(3) The amount of claims or defenses asserted by the
cardholder does not exceed: (a) the initial amount of credit
extended in connection with the initial transaction giving
rise to the claim or defense, provided the cardholder notifies
the card issuer and the person honoring the card of such
claim or defense within three months from the date of such
transaction; or (b) if the cardholder notifies the card issuer
and person honoring the card of such claim or defense later
than three months following the date of such transaction,
the amount outstanding with respect to such transaction at
the time of such notification. For the purpose of determin-
79. See notes 10, 33, 37, supra.
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ing such amount outstanding in the preceding sentence, the
payments and credits to the cardholder's account are
deemed to have been applied, in the order indicated, to the
payment of: (i) late charges in the order of their entry to
the account; (ii) finance charges in order of their entry to
the account; and (iii) debits to the account other than those
set forth above, in the order in which each debit entry to
the account was made.
B. It is further provided that: (1) the prevailing party in
any action in which claims or defenses are raised pursuant
to this section may, in the sound discretion of the judge, be
awarded costs of litigation and incidental costs; and (2) if
as a result of notification of the card issuer of the details of
the dispute, the card issuer, through its associate institu-
tions, charges back the obligation to the person honoring
the card, that person may, if he prevails in a suit on the
obligation against the cardholder, recover attorney's fees
and incidental costs, including any chargeback fees, which
fees and costs may be awarded in the sound discretion of
the judge.
The proposed statute is patterned after the Proxmire-Brooke
bill with several significant alterations and additions. For conveni-
ence, the provisions of the bill will be discussed in the order in which
they appear.
The language of the first paragraph has been retained virtually
intact except for the addition of language limiting the application
of the bill to transactions involving the purchase or rental of durable
consumer goods. Liability for any tort claims is specifically ex-
cluded, as it was in the Proxmire bill, to avoid the possibility of any
products liability actions involving the credit card plans. The limi-
tation to durable goods avoids unmanageable controversies involv-
ing dissatisfaction with food, motel accommodations and personal
services. Though there may be situations involving nondurable
goods or services which would lend themselves to the suggestion
that the card systems should shoulder some responsibility in these
areas as well, it is believed that a more moderate approach in the
initial stages is warranted. If, after the card plans have operated
under the proposed statute for some significant period of time, it
becomes clear that a specific type of nondurable good or service
presents a problem of continued abuse, properly limited and specific
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extensions of liability may be considered. The proposed statute is
not intended to be an ultimate cure-all, but rather a reasonable and
manageable first step in protecting the consumer in the majority of
credit card transactions.
Paragraph A (1) represents an amended version of the same
paragraph in the Proxmire bill. The concept of "good faith attempt"
is embellished in two significant respects, however. The require-
ment of prompt notification is intended to limit the liability of the
bank card system to those claims pursued with reasonable diligence.
Under no circumstances will claiiims or defenses be protected when
the consumer has prejudiced any party involved by careless or
undue delay. Similarly, by requiring the consumer to offer to return
the disputed merchandise for a refund, the statute avoids placing
the depository bank or merchant at an unconscionable disadvantage
when dealing with a consumer located some distance away. The
merchant always has the relatively inexpensive option of treating
the transaction just as any other "return" transaction if he so
chooses. Moreover, those consumers who intend to bilk the mer-
chant or card system by keeping the merchandise and conducting
sham negotiations are unlikely to be inclined to offer an immediate
return of the merchandise as the first step in their plan." If they do
not do this, however, they are not covered by the statute and stand
in the same position as they would today. Thus the paragraph in
large measure screens out the more common opportunities for con-
sumer abuse of the statute.
Paragraph A (2) requires prompt notification to the issuing
bank of the details of any dispute in which the cardholder intends
to withhold payments. Such notification allows the card system to
look into the dispute as promptly as possible and to avoid any undue
accumulation of identical problems in the case of the more obvious
merchant abuses. Prompt notification will facilitate an early discov-
ery of such practices and a more efficient "weeding out" process by
the card system involved. It also allows the bank card system to
enter or facilitate any negotiatons for settlement at their very incep-
80. Clearly, most consumers, even the dishonest ones, will be unaware of the right to
assert defenses under the statute. Those who do take the time to read and digest the provi-
sions of the statute will be aware that sham tactics will result in forfeiture of any rights
provided by the statute and will in addition subject them to liability for legal fees. In either
case, the statute will not encourage consumer abuse; indeed it may reduce some kinds of
abuse.
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tion, and to exert whatever influence they can toward a proper
compromise .8,
Paragraph A (3) is adopted verbatim from the Proxmire bill. In
essence, it limits liability under the statute to those defects which
are immediately apparent to the consumer, or nearly so. For the
considerable number of bank card holders who routinely pay bank
card billings within the billing period or within a period of 90 days
or less, there is, in effect, a three month statute of limitations for
the assertion of any claims whatever against the card issuer. In such
cases, only the very obvious and outrageous instance of merchant
abuse, such as failure of delivery, delivery of substituted goods or
delivery of obviously defective goods is likely to prompt the con-
sumer to give required notice and proceed with a lawsuit. Even in
those cases in which payments are extended over the longest possi-
ble period, the average transaction will be paid up within a rela-
tively short time since minimum payment requirements assure that
at least ten dollars will be paid on account each month.82 Quite
plainly, the card system is not being placed in the position of war-
rantor of consumer goods, but is rather being required to take some
responsibility for only the most obvious and immediately apparent
merchant abuses.
Section B (1) provides for recovery of costs of litigation when
the judge deems it appropriate. This provision should have a sub-
stantial effect on the amount of consumer abuse of this statute. For
example, if a consumer decides to refuse to pay for a given purchase
without any substantial defense, the bank may initially threaten
litigation and point out the cost recovery provision to the reluctant
consumer. If this does not have any effect, the filing of a lawsuit will
in most cases result in a default judgment just as it does now. In
order to avoid default, the consumer will have to consult an attor-
ney. That attorney may be expected to be quite reluctant to invest
any significant amount of his own time on anything other than a
cash-in-advance basis when the total amount in controversy is less
than the legal fees he expects to generate. At that point in time the
consumer may be expected to come to grips with the economic
81. The bank is likely to be an impartial mediator in these situations, since it stands
to profit from continued association with both parties; the mere presence of the bank card
system in negotiations will also prompt those merchants and cardholders who value the credit
card privilege to negotiate earnestly and in good faith.
82. Both Master Charge and Bank Americard require minimum payments of $10 or five
percent of the outstanding balance, whichever is the greater amount.
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shortcomings of his original plan. Given the choice of defaulting and
thus being forced to pay, or making voluntary payment with a view
to reconciliation with the card issuer (if only to keep the card long
enough to refine his scheme), a good number of these originally
reluctant consumers may be expected to pay voluntarily.
Section B (2) provides that the merchant who has a bank card
billing charged back to him may also recover costs of suit in appro-
priate instances, and again the purpose of the provision is to make
the pursuit of just claims economically feasible and to insure against
consumer abuse of the privilege of asserting defenses. In addition,
by providing for recovery of chargeback costs, if any, the statute
provides a mechanism for recoupment of some portion of the admin-
istrative and clerical costs of the chargeback process when the mer-
chant is not at fault in the dispute.
It will be noticed that the limitation of claims to those of $50
or more in value has not been included in the proposed statute.
Since the average credit card transaction is for an amount of about
$20,13 such a limitation would exclude the vast majority of credit
card transactions from the provisions of the statute. More impor-
tantly, such a limitation would take the small-scale swindle out of
the range of the statute, even when joinder of claims or the estab-
lishment of a proper class of plaintiffs would place hundreds or
thousands of dollars in controversy. It would seem that a more rea-
sonable approach to the problem of the smaller transaction lies in
the provisions for recovery of litigation expenses as opposed to any
arbitrary dollar limitation. Given the rather persuasive economics
involved in asserting a claim or raising a defense in a court of law,
it is extremely unlikely that individuals will be utilizing the statute
in small transaction situations unless the merchant abuse has been
extreme or aggregation of claims has taken place.
Similarly, the proposed statute contains no geographical limi-
tation. As indicated above, allocation of responsibility for merchant
abuses to the depository' banks within the charge card system will
eliminate problems which would ordinarily be faced if the issuing
banks were responsible. When disputed billings are charged back to
merchants located a considerable distance from complaining con-
sumers, the provision for recovery of fees and costs will allow pursuit
of justifiable claims by those merchants. Finally, the merchant has
83. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 5, at 1038.
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the option of avoiding any litigation by accepting the consumer's
offer to return the merchandise for a refund. Given these alterna-
tives, both the bank card system and the merchant have the means
to prevail in those cases in which they are innocent of any wrongdo-
ing.
In total effect, the proposed statute provides a mechanism for
innocent parties in a charge card dispute to transfer losses to those
parties most nearly responsible. On a theoretical level the proposed
statute, unlike the existing arrangement, provides a fair result in
every situation in which the offending party is present and amena-
ble to suit. It further provides an incentive for those within its
provisions to limit abuses, and by doing so, promotes a more healthy
and honest business climate for the developing credit card economy.
Most importantly, it complies with those fundamental notions of
justice universally understood by the lay public, and thus promotes
respect for our economy and our laws, a distinction neither claimed
nor enjoyed by the present legal concepts.
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